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Young: Parental Rights

THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS:
THE STATES' RESPONSE TO LASSITER
Rosalie R. Young'
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held in Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services2 that there was no constitutional
right to counsel for indigent parents facing involuntary
termination of parental rights.3 The Lassiter Court mandated a
case by case evaluation of the need for counsel based upon the
balancing test described in Mathews v. Eldridge4 which requires a
consideration of the private interests, the interests of the state,
and the risk of an erroneous deprivation.5 Observers worried that
' B.A. (Pennsylvania State University); M.S.S.W. (Columbia University
School of Social Work); M.A., Ph.D. (Syracuse University). The author is an
assistant professor in the Public Justice Department of the State University of

New York at Oswego, whose research focuses on the civil legal needs of the
poor and near poor. She is grateful to the staff at the library of the Syracuse

University College of Law for their assistance with this research.
2 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
3 Id. at 33.
4 424 U.S.

319, 335 (1976). The Supreme Court held that an evidentiary

hearing is not required prior to termination of disability benefits because
administrative procedures fully complied with due process. Id. at 349.
5
Id. at 335. See also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 561, 570
(1996). In December 1996, the Supreme Court held that denying a parent the
transcript necessary to appeal the termination of her parental rights because of
her inability to pay the record preparation fees would be a denial of rights
granted in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 561-70.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg
recognized that the importance of parental rights required deference and
protection, while citing, without question, the Lassiter Court's holding that
when parental rights are threatened a case-by-case evaluation of the need for
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the Lassiter decision had removed any incentive for states to
provide indigent parents with full due process protection6 by
prompting state courts and legislatures to determine that indigent
parents "do not need - or do not deserve -- legal
representation. "7 There was fear that the Lassiter decision might
encourage those states that required counsel to curtail their efforts

and discourage others states from mandating counsel.8

Were

indigent parents better off before their appeal to the Supreme

Court?
Answering this question requires responding to three
separate queries: How has the Lassiter decision been utilized by
state courts? Have there been alterations in the provision of
counsel in the thirty-three states that guaranteed parental
representation prior to Lassiter? How has the right to counsel in
termination proceedings evolved in the seventeen states that
denied the right to counsel prior to Lassiter?
Although lower courts frequently expand individual rights
in response to an anticipated Supreme Court decision,9

counsel, subject to appellate review, is sufficient. Id. at 564 (citing Lassiter,
452 U.S. at 32).
6 Anthony H. Trembley, Alone Against the State: Right to Counsel in
Parental Termination Proceedings, 15 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1123, 1143-44
(1982).
' Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating ParentalRights: The Indigent Parent's
Right to Counsel After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L. Q. 205, 219
(1981). Besharov did suggest that the Lassiter might also be seen as "a
cautious, but nevertheless striking, expansion of due process doctrine to
include the right to counsel in 'civil' proceedings." Id. at 217. While the
decision did not guarantee counsel, the Court did indicate that there was a right
to counsel in civil proceedings under special circumstances. Id. at 216-217.
Parents' Right to Counsel in Proceedings to
8 Douglas J. Besharov,
Terminate ParentalRights: Factors to Consider, 61 CHILD WELFARE 247, 248
(1982).

9 Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding
Individual ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1984). See, e.g.,
Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). In Davis, a decision
rendered while Lassiter was under consideration by the Supreme Court, a
divided Fifth Circuit held that there was a right to counsel for indigent parents
in jeopardy of loss of parental rights. Id. at 604. The Davis court viewed loss
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constitutional interpretation "is not a single set of truths, but an
ongoing debate about the meaning of the rule of law in a political
order." 1" This paper offers evidence that while state court
respect the precedents of the
decisions acknowledge and
Supreme Court, state courts continue to operate independently,
reflecting differing state experiences, statutes, constitutions, and
mores,"1 often interpreting rights more broadly than the Supreme
12

Court.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL PRIOR TO LASSITER
Beginning with Gideon v. Wainwright 3 in 1963 and In re
Gault" in 1967, the Supreme Court appeared to be paving the
way for an expanded right to counsel based on the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of "procedural due process through a fair
hearing."' 5 State courts have expanded the right to counsel for
of parental rights to be a threat to "family integrity," a liberty interest
protected by the Constitution. Id.
10 Paul W. Kahn, Commentary: Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147-48 (1993).
11 Id. at 1161.

Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal: Procedure:
State Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRUI. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 63, 66 (Fall 1996). Latzer suggests that state courts are at least
as "rights-sensitive" as the United States Supreme Court. Barry Latzer, paper
presented at the New York Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
Ithaca, New York (March 30, 1996).
13 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The Supreme Court ruled that a criminal
defendant has a fundamental right to counsel in state courts under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 335.
14 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
The Supreme Court held that a juvenile whose
liberty interests are threatened in delinquency proceedings is entitled to due
process rights, including notification of the right to counsel and the
appointment of counsel if neither the juvenile nor his parents can afford to
retain counsel. Id. at 41.
"5 Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed
Counsel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80
A.L.R.3d 1141, 1144 (1977). A survey of statutory and case law is indicative
of a trend toward establishing the right of an indigent parent to appointed
12
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criminal defendants, basing their decisions on interpretations of
Supreme Court holdings, on state constitutions, on state statutes,
and on their own rule-making authority.' 6 Both state and federal
courts, however, have frequently differentiated between criminal
and civil due process rights.' 7
The requirements of due process are neither clearly
defined, nor static. When the state uses its "enforcement power
to transfer property from one person to another," the state must
satisfy due process requirements. 8 As Justice Blackmun stated in
his dissenting opinion in Lassiter, "what process is due varies in
relation to the interests at stake and the nature of the
governmental proceedings.
Where the individual's liberty
interest is of diminished or less than fundamental stature, or
where the prescribed procedure involves informal decision
making without the trappings of an adversarial trial-type
proceeding, counsel has not been a requisite of due process.""
By the late 1970s, however, state and federal case law
frequently recognized the right to counsel in termination of

parental rights proceedings, including the requirement of state
sponsored appointment of counsel for indigent parents.2" Prior to
counsel in a proceeding to determine involuntary termination of parental
rights. Id.
16 Larry W. Miller, The Right to Counsel: State Courts on the Front Line,
1984 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 179, 190-91 (1985). "[S]tate courts are not
limited by the United States Constitution in expounding the rights of their own
citizens. A state court, interpreting its own law, may grant broader protections
than established federal minimums." Id. at 190.
17 See Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228 (Md. 1983). Where a
party's liberty interest is threatened, however, courts generally require that a
full quantum of rights be provided, including the right to counsel, whether the
case is criminal or civil in nature. Id. at 234.
"8 Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 276-77 (1982) (citing Giacco v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966)).
'9 Lassiter, 452

U.S. at 37.

'0 Robert Catz & John T. Kuelbs, The Requirements of Appointment of
Counsel for Indigent Parents in Neglect or Termination Proceedings: A
Developing Area, 13 J. FAM. L. 223 (1974). The courts based this fast
developing right to counsel on Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection grounds "requir[ing] that an indigent parent in a child neglect or
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Lassiter, anticipating a similar Supreme Court decision, both state
and federal courts regularly held that the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

required that parents facing termination of parental rights
proceedings must be informed of the right to appointed counsel."'
Even after the Lassiter Court held that there was no constitutional
right to counsel for parents threatened with the loss of their
parental rights, some state courts have interpreted similar due

process clauses in their state constitutions to mandate the
appointment of counsel.'
Both state and federal courts have recognized

the

"fundamental nature" of the right to parental custody.23 Since the
parents whose parental rights have been terminated may have no
knowledge of or control over the location of their children or the
right to visitation,' termination of parental rights is a drastic
process. In some states, children retain the right to support and
inheritance until there is an adoption, despite the parent's loss of

parental rights termination proceeding be afforded counsel at no cost,
and.. be advised of this right." Id.
21
Crist v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 320 A.2d 203, 211 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); In re Ella R.B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 356, 285
N.E.2d 288, 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d. 133, 136 (1972); State ex rel. Heller v.
Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ohio 1980); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203
S.E.2d 140, 145 (W.Va. 1974).
" See V.F. v. Alaska, 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1983). The Supreme Court
of Alaska held that the Due Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution provided
for the right to counsel in proceedings intended to terminate parental rights.
Id. at 44. But see Carroll v. Moore, 423 N.W.2d 757, 767 (Neb. 1988)
(holding that both the Nebraska and United States Constitutions require an
"absolute right to court-appointed counsel for a putative father in a paternity
proceeding to avoid the risk of a "one-sided trial."). See also Right to Counsel
in ParentalRights Proceedings, 69 A.B.A. 1756-57 (1983).
1 See Smith, supra note 15 at 1145. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405

U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (holding that an unwed father could not be denied
due process rights or presumed to be unfit without a hearing to determine
fitness before he could be separated from his children).
24

3

DONALD KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 10

(Donald Kramer

ed., 2d ed. 1994).
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visitation and control.' Other state statutes provide that when
parental rights are terminated, for that parent "the child shall
forever thereafter cease to exist. "26

THE COMPETITION FOR WILLIAM LASSITER
In 1975, William, the infant son of Abby Gail Lassiter,
adjudicated
a neglected child. William was transferred to the
was
custody of the Department of Social Services of Durham County,
North Carolina, after the district court heard evidence that he was
not receiving adequate medical care and was malnourished.
According to the state, William's mother had declined to appear
for the custody hearing for the youngest of her five children and
had visited the child only once since he entered foster care.
A year after William was removed from his home, Ms.
Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and was
sentenced to 25 to 40 years in prison.21 According to the
Department of Social Services, Ms. Lassiter's mother had
custody of the older children and had previously stated that she
2 A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (West 1989). The text of the statute
states in relevant part: "Th[e] right of inheritance and support shall only be
terminated by a final order of adoption." Id. See also HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 31-571-63 (1993). The text of the statute states in relevant part: "No
judgment of termination of parental rights ... shall operate to terminate
mutual rights of inheritance of the child and the parent or parents involved, or
to terminate the legal duties and libilities of the parent or parents, unless and
until the child has been legally adopted." Id.
26 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1113 (1993). The text of the statute states in
relevant part:
Upon the issuance of an order terminating the existing parental
rights and transferring such parental rights to another person or
organization, the effect of such order shall be that all of the rights,
duties, privileges and obligations recognized by law between the
person or persons whose parental rights are terminateL and the child
shall forever thereafter cease to exist.
Id.
27 See generally In re J.L.D., 794 P.2d 319 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that imprisonment may, however, prevent the parent from fulfilling his or her
parental responsibilities, but the interest of the child must be maintained).
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could not handle an additional child. At the termination hearing,
the grandmother denied making this statement. During the
termination proceeding, Ms. Lassiter represented herself. The
transcript reveals that she had difficulty understanding the court
rules of examination and cross examination and was unable to
effectively challenge conflicting testimony. At every stage of the
hearing, whether or not such statements were appropriate, Ms.
Lassiter denied her lack of interest in her child and asserted her
desire that William be raised with his siblings.' The North
Carolina trial court approved the termination of her parental
rights.
Abby Gail Lassiter appealed the decision to terminate her
parental rights, claiming that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that she be provided with
After North
counsel during the termination proceedings.
Carolina courts affirmed the termination, Ms. Lassiter brought
her case to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari.
Despite the broadening of the right to counsel during
proceedings to terminate parental rights by numerous state and
federal courts,29 the Lassiter Court declared that indigents had a
constitutional right to appointed counsel only when their liberty
was in jeopardy." Justice Stewart lauded the thirty-three states
that have statutes requiring counsel for indigents threatened with
termination of parental rights?.3 The Court held that counsel
might be required only if the case was complex, if complicated
expert testimony was involved, if the parent was unable to
understand the legal process, or if the possibility that criminal
charges of neglect or abuse might arise.32 The Court held that the
determination of whether to assign counsel must be made on a
28
29

See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 23 (1981).
See generally Smith, supra note 15.at 1145.

30

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.

Id. at 34.
See generally Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18 (holding that appointment of
counsel to an indigent parent is not required unless the trial court first finds
that counsel is necessary for due process, subject to appellate review).
31

31
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case by case basis,33 leaving the parent uncertain of his or her
rights until the parent has "gone through the process of
determining whether the balance of interests entitles him" or her
to receive counsel.34

Justice Stewart expressed fitting respect for the "lofty"
concepts of "due process" and "fundamental fairness." 35 In his
elaboration, however, he declared these terms to be ambiguous
and suggested that the requirements of due process and
fundamental fairness could be fulfilled only "by first considering
any relevant precedents
and then by assessing the several interests
36
stake."
that are at
The Lassiter majority ignored Justice Blackmun's
dissenting argument that " [ b]y emphasizing the value of physical
liberty to the exclusion of all other fundamental interests, the
Court today grafts an unnecessary and burdensome new layer of
analysis onto its traditional three-factor balancing test."37 While
balancing tests are increasingly viewed as a rational method of
dealing with competing interests, formulas may inadvertently
devalue or promote the interests of one party over the interests of
another.38 Balancing requires evaluating fundamental fairness,
formality and informality, public interests and costs, and private
interests, among other considerations.

9

Justice Blackmun argued

that the prospect of error is enhanced by a lack of
representation.' The standards by which a parent is judged are

3 Id. at 31.
3'Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REv. 977,
998-99 (1986).
31Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24.
36

Id. at 25.

3 Id. at 41 n. 8. The Court has accepted the balancing test described in
Mathews, supra note 4, which requires a consideration of private interests,
interests of the state, and the risk of an erroneous decision.
3' T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L. J. 943, 1004 (1987).
39 Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV.
1141, 1147 (1984).
40

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 44.
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not simple, nor easily defined; they are imprecise and responsive
to the values of the presiding judge.4

Justice Blackmun admitted that the results in Lassiter
might have been the same if counsel had been provided, but he
cautioned that fairness and due process required counsel to
minimize the danger of an erroneous decision and increase
confidence in the results of the court proceedings. 42 As the North

Dakota Supreme Court noted in 1993, "[w]e are skeptical that the
denial of counsel in an adoption proceeding which results in the
termination of parental rights can ever be 'harmless' under any
standard."43 Legal scholar Laurence Tribe suggested that "the
real basis for Lassiter may lie in the singularly unsympathetic
facts of the case," rather than the broader issue of the right to
counsel." Regardless of the rationale, the decision of the Lassiter
court became the standard upon which the right to counsel was
evaluated.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIP
The courts have long recognized the value of family, often
keeping children with their natural parents in a questionable home
so long that the children are no longer likely to be adopted.4s
41

Id. at 45.

Id. at 57. Abby Gail Lassiter had expressed little interest in her son
subsequent to his placement in adoption. Id. at 18. Ms. Lassiter was serving
a 25 to 40 year prison sentence for second degree murder at the time of her
appeal. Id. at 17. But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (stating that after
being confined for years because of a lewd phone call, the juvenile made a
much more appealing petitioner).
" In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 567 (N.D. 1993).
44 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1652 (2d ed.
1988). In a case with similar controversy, a father of four challenged the
termination of his parental rights following his conviction for murdering the
mother of his children. In re Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr.
56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). The California court held that Rodriguez had a right
to counsel. Id.
41

4s HARRY KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUT SHELL 242 (2d ed. 1986).
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Many state courts have acknowledged that the importance of this
relationship necessitates counsel,4 since the loss of a child
"forever" certainly demands the same protections as one day in
jail. 7 The Washington Supreme Court held that "an indigent
parent facing the possible loss of a child cnnot be said to have a
meaningful right to be heard in a7 contested proceeding without
the assistance of counsel. "This is particularly so where the
State, her adversary, is not only represented by counsel but also
has vastly superior resources for investigation and presentation of
its case. ,48
Despite these decisions and the statutes of thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia that had previously required
counsel, the bare majority of the Court in Lassiter decided that
denial of counsel did not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth

Amendment.

9

The

resulting

case

by

case

determination of the right to counsel for parents facing the
involuntary termination of their parental rights"0 perpetuated a
policy that had earlier been found to be ineffective, "messy and
friction-generating " " in other contexts.52 Unrepresented parents
are unlikely to understand ambiguously worded balancing tests or
legal processes. In addition, without legal assistance or prior
experience, parents may not recognize that a case is unusually
complex or that complicated expert testimony is involved, the
See Danforth v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973).
"[T]he necessity of a particular safeguard is to be evaluated in light of the
nature of the proceeding and by the nature of the interest upon which the
government seeks to infringe." Id. at 799.
47 In re Luscier, 524 P.2d 906, 909 (Wash. 1974) (en banc) (holding that
the Constitution of the state of Washington and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution mandate counsel to guarantee due process when
permanent deprivation of a child is threatened).
48 Dep't of Public Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Mass. 1979).
49 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33.
'o Id. at 31.
46

51 JOHN H. ELY,

REvIEW

DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

125 (1980) (noting fewer problems when counsel was required in all

felony cases);

ANTHONY

LEWIS, GIDEON's TRUMPET

123-27 (1966) (noting

confusion in state courts' determination of right to counsel).
52 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
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requirements3 which mandate the provision of counsel according
5

to Lassiter.

THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF THE INDIGENT
LITIGANT
Because poor children are much more likely to be
removed from their homes following allegations of neglect or
abuse, the right to counsel is vital to indigent parents." For the
indigent parent, the right to "hire an attorney at their own
expense is a cruel sham; the protection it confers is a fiction." 5
When financial resources differentiate between those who can
effectively represent themselves through counsel and those who
cannot, those with funds are labeled as "normal," while the poor
are considered to be "deviant." 56 Even the level of poverty one
must reach to qualify for the protection of counsel remains
unclear.'
The coercive power and resources of the government
representatives seeking the termination *f parental rights can be
especially intimidating to the indigent parent.58 A parent
appearing pro se must deal with complex procedures, confusing
issues, and vague and broad statutes. 59 That parent must "execute
basic advocacy functions to delineate the issues, investigate and
conduct discovery, present factual contentions in an orderly

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
54 Id. at 153-55.
51 Catz & Kuelbs, supra note 20, at 233.
56
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our
Helplessness, 79 GEO. L. J. 1499, 1500 (1991).
57 Eric Neisser, Chargingfor Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 74 GEO. L. J. 257, 287 (1985).
58 Note, Child Neglect: Due Processfor the Parent, 70 COL. L. REv. 465,
477-78 (1970) (noting that state's extensive legal resources can be extremely
intimidating to indigent parents).
s9 Catz & Kuelbs, supra note 20, at 228-29.
53
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manner, cross examine witnesses, make objections, and preserve
a record for appeal."'6
Research offers evidence that counsel is critical to the
maintenance of legal rights, even in matters less fundamental than
parental rights. Housing studies reveal that as many as 75
percent of those who enter housing court would be evicted
without representation, while more than 78 percent of those who
are represented retain their housing. 6' Unrepresented litigants
often are not aware of their rights or, if aware, are unfamiliar
with the legal terminology necessary to gain judicial attention.62
Although the North Carolina Department of Social
Services was represented by counsel, the Lassiter majority
maintained that "the case presented no specially troublesome
points of law, either procedural or substantive," that necessitated
the appointment of representation for Abby Gail Lassiter.63 Even
when the state is represented by a social worker or other nonlegal authority, that representative's prior courtroom experience
gives the state an edge over the emotionally involved, legally
unsophisticated, or inexperienced parent.' The result is a "gross
disparity in power and resources between the State and the
uncounseled indigent parent."65
The Court has continued to limit the right to counsel to
instances where there is some loss of personal liberty, holding
that there is no right to counsel in a criminal case where a

' Amicus Brief, American Bar Association at 9, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1980) (No. 79-6423).
61

ARLEN SUE Fox,

ANALYZING

THE

FIRST

BROOKLYN

Two

LEGAL

YEARS

OF

SERVS CORP.

OUR

HRA

A,

REPORT

DEMONSTRATION

HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION PROJECT 11 (1989).
62 Id. at 14-15. See also Marshall J. Breger,

Legal Aid for the Poor: A
ConceptualAnalysis, 60 N.C. L. REv. 282, 287 (1981).
63 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. at 32-33.

6 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: S" ?culations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 107, 113 (Fall 1974). The

"repeat player" has an edge over the first time legal participant, even when

neither litigant is a lawyer. Id.
65

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

See also In re

Friesz, 208 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Neb. 1973).
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conviction occurs without incarceration." As Douglas Besharov
pointedly observes, "Lassiter, for all practical purposes, stands
for the proposition that a drunken driver's night in the cooler is a
greater deprivation of liberty than a parent's permanent loss of
rights in a child." 67

TLE STUDY
Individual states may expand citizen rights beyond those
required by the federal courts and legislatures. Although states
may not provide fewer rights than those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, "[a] wise public policy ... may require that

higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under
the Constitution."' Therefore, at a minimum, the states must
apply the Eldridge balancing test 9 to determine the need for
counsel in involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings,
as outlined in Lassiter .'o Since there is no absolute right to

' Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
67 Besharov, supra note 7 at 221. The courts have recognized the irony.
In 1982, the Supreme Court of Iowa indicated that when loss of liberty is
threatened, there should be no distinction between civil and criminal matters.
McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982). A few months later,
the same court acknowledged the high cost of providing counsel for all parties
who might ignore court rulings and later be held in contempt of court and
incarcerated, such as defendants who fail to pay court-ordered support
following a hearing to establish paternity. See State er rel. Hamilton v.
Snodgrass, 325 N.W.2d 740, 743-44 (Iowa 1982). The Hamilton court
indicated that neither the United States Constitution nor the Iowa Constitution
required counsel and urged the legislature to handle this sticky issue. Id. In
such situations, the parent who has failed to pay support has a right to counsel,
while the parent in financial distress because of the lack of support payments is
not entitled to counsel. Other state courts have held that the contempt
defendant in such a situation is not entitled to counsel. See Courtney v.
Courtney, 475 N.E.2d 1284, 1292 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
6' Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33-34; Miller, supra note 16,at 190.
69 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
70 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-32.
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counsel, 7' on appeal a parent may only question whether the

Eldridge standards were applied appropriately.
The current statutes in the seventeen states that denied
parental right to counsel in termination of parental rights
proceedings prior to 1981 can be divided into three categories:
provision of counsel on a case by case basis as provided in
Lassiter, without a guarantee of counsel; a right to counsel only
when legal representation is requested by the parents; and a
mandated representation statute in which the judge must indicate
on the record why counsel was not appointed.
Of the seventeen states that failed to guarantee the right to
counsel prior to Lassiter, five states continue to follow the
Eldridge standards and a case by case evaluation as outlined in
Lassiter. In Delaware, Hawaii, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Wyoming, the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in
termination of parental rights proceedings is left to the discretion
of the trial judge. While neither statute nor case law may require
counsel for every case, some courts and legislatures have clearly
indicated that representation should be the custom, rather than the
exception.72 (See Table I for a summary of the current status of
the right to counsel in the seventeen states which denied the right
"' In re Carolyn S.S., 498 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Del. 1984).

Chief Justice

Herrmann of the Delaware Supreme Court agreed that both the Delaware and
United States Constitutions permit judicial discretion in the appointment of
counsel for parents threatened with termination of parental rights. Id. at 1098.
Justice Herrmann recommended that the General Assembly of Delaware

consider legislation that would require counsel for indigent parents threatened
with termination of their parental rights, consistent with the majority of the
states, as noted in Lassiter. Id. at 1098-99.
7 S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1570 (Law. Co-op. 1996). The South Carolina
Children's Code requires a case by case determination of the need for counsel,
but adds a caveat: "If the parent is indigent and counsel is not appointed, the
judge shall enter on the record the reasons counsel was not required." Id.

See South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vanderhorst, 34 ' S.E.2d 149 (S.C.
1986). In Vanderhorst, the South Carolina Supreme Court indicated that
although due process standards do not require counsel in all proceedings to

terminate parental rights, "we caution that under our interpretation of
Lassiter," those "cases in which appointment of counsel is not required should
be the exception." Id. at 153.
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to counsel prior to Lassiter. See Table Ill for citations to the
relevant state statutes).
Six of the seventeen states require the appointment of
counsel for all indigent parents threatened with the termination of
parental rights if, and only if, the parents request the appointment
of counsel and meet the trial judge's interpretation of indigence or
hardship. Arkansas, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
South Dakota insist that parents be notified of the right to the
assistance of counsel and the right to the appointment of counsel,
if parents are indigent or if retaining counsel would present a
hardship. In Georgia, there is no requirement that parents be
notified of the right to counsel, although counsel will be
appointed if a parental request is made." These states require
that parents respond to the notification of proceedings to
terminate parental rights and request that counsel be appointed for
them. If parents fail to request counsel in court or contact the
public defender's office as is required in some states, the absence
of representation may not considered to be an error or a denial of
the right to counsel.74 District of Columbia courts have worried
that parents may be unaware of their right to request counsel, 7"
thus missing the opportunity for appointed counsel, though it is
acknowledged that the appointment of counsel is a privilege,
rather than a constitutional right.76 In all these states, the court
retains the right, absent a request, to appoint counsel if,
according to the court, the interests of justice require the
appointment of counsel. In practice, some states may require
counsel absent an intelligent waiver 7
73 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-85 (1997). In Georgia, statute and case law
require the appointment of counsel for a child involved in a parental rights
proceeding. Any termination reached without the appointment of counsel for
the child is invalid because counsel may be able to find a way to retain the
parent-child relationship. See In re J.D.O., 357 S.E.2d 330, 331 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1987).
' In re Ramsey, Minor Children, 656 N.E.2d 1311, 1312-13 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995).
' Thompson v. Thompson, 559 A.2d 311 (D.C. 1989).
76

In re L.H. & L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1233 (D.C. 1993).

' See State v. Jamison, 444 P.2d 15, 17 (Or. 1968) (en bane) (holding
that "waiver can not be inferred from a failure to request counsel by a person
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Six of the states which failed to guarantee counsel prior to
Lassiter have enacted the most demanding right to counsel
statutes. These states require counsel for parents threatened with
the loss of parental rights, absent a knowledgeable waiver of the
right to counsel. In Florida, North Carolina, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, and West Virginia, the judge must, at each stage of the
proceedings, explain that there is a right to counsel and that
counsel will be appointed for those who cannot afford to retain
representation. Some of these states provide that the court record
must indicate that counsel has been offered and explain why any
unrepresented parent was not provided with counsel.7"
With one exception, the thirty-three states that provided
the right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings
prior to Lassiter have continued to refine this right through both
statute and case law. According to the current statutes, ten states
require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents threatened
with the termination of parental rights, absent an intelligent
waiver. (See Table II.) Twenty-two of the remaining states and
the District of Columbia require that counsel be appointed if an
indigent parent requests counsel and meets local standards for
indigence. Although the petitioner's brief in Lassiter indicated
that Mississippi provided for a right to counsel, the section of the
Mississippi Code 71 to which the Lassiter brief refers was
repealed in 1979, two years before the Lassiter decision. Current

who, insofar as the record reveals, [did] not know of her right to courtappointed counsel.").
71

In re R.W. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitation Servs., 429 So.2d 711

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The Fifth District Court of Appeals of Florida
held that merely informing a parent that she had a right to counsel and

directing her to a legal aid office, "while withholding court appointment and
failing to establish a knowing waiver of record, did not pass constitutional
muster." Id. at 712.
79 MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-17 (1972). The status of counsel for indigent
parents facing termination of parental rights in 1981 is unclear, despite the
indication in the petitioner's brief in Lassiter that legal representation was

available. See Appendix B, infra.
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Mississippi practice leaves the appointment of counsel to the
discretion of the presiding judge.W
In Lassiter, the Supreme Court provided for discretionary
standards for determining the right to counsel in termination of
parental rights proceedings. As a result, trial judges in the
seventeen states that failed to guarantee the right to counsel in
1981 were required, at a minimum, to evaluate the need for
counsel on a case by case basis. Since that time, twelve of these
states have enacted a broad variety of statutes that require the
provision of counsel for indigent parents in every termination
proceeding or at the request of the parents involved. Thirty-two
of the thirty-three states that provided the right to counsel in
termination of parental rights proceeding prior to Lassiter have
continued to provide for the appointment of counsel through both
statute and case law. The fear of the curtailment of rights
following Lassiterhas not been validated.

OTHER BARRIERS TO DUE PROCESS
Despite statutes that guarantee the right to counsel, due
process depends upon the implementation of the right to counsel
laws and related statutes in the trial level courts in communities
across the nation. A review of state codes exposes practices that
may jeopardize parental rights. Indigence levels vary from state
to state. Most statutes leave the declaration of indigence to the
trial level courts and legal definitions of financial "hardship" are
diverse."'
sO Court and legal agency personnel indicate that counsel is rarely
appointed. Parents must either represent themselves or frind an alternate means
of obtaining counsel. Telephone Interviews with Mississippi court personnel
(July 1996).
81 See ARK. CODE ANN. §9-27-316 (b) (1)(Michie 1995). The text states
in pertinent part: "The inquiry concerning the ability of the juvenile to retain
counsel shall include a consideration of the juvenile's financial resources and
the financial resources of his or her family."; IDAHO CODE 19-854 (1987).
The text states in pertinent part: "[I]n determining whether a person is a needy
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While some statutes and courts are zealous in requiring
that parents be informed of their right to appointed counsel, other
states require that the parent be sufficiently knowledgeable on
their own to recognize the need to ask for counsel. Parents who
lack an awareness of the need for counsel at the trial level may be
unaware of the right to appeal a termination decision, if their due
process rights have been denied.
The Supreme Court has ruled that parental rights are so
fundamental that government agencies must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that parental rights should be terminated.'
The Court was dissatisfied with a New York ruling that a
preponderance standard was sufficiently fair. 3 The actual
meaning of "clear and convincing evidence" is left to state courts
to interpret.

person and in determining the extent of his inability to pay, the court
concerned may consider such factors as income, property owned, outstanding
obligations, and the number and ages of dependents." ID.; ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4005.2 (West 1992). The text states in pertinent part:
"Parents and custodians are entitled to legal counsel in child protection
proceedings .... The court, if it finds them indigent, shall appoint and pay
the reasonable costs and expenses of their legal counsel." Id.
82 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765 (1982).
Following
Santosky, states such as Idaho revised their statutes to require a "clear and
convincing" level of proof. See IDAHO CODE § 16-2009 (1995).
83 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764-65. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1987
sets higher standards for termination procedures involving Indian children or
children of one Indian parent. 25 U.S.C. §1901 (1994). Before parental
rights can be terminated, the ICWA requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
"that the continued custody of the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 U.S.C. §1912(0.
In addition, parents of an Indian child or an Indian custodian must be provided
with counsel when faced with termination of parental rights if they are unable
to afford legal representation. 25 U.S.C. §1912(b). In an effort to keep
Indian children with Indian families, tribal representatives must also be
informed and involved whenever termination of parental rights procedures are
brought against the parents of an Indian child. 25 U.S.C. §1912(a).
" See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S.Ct. 555, 572 (1996) (holding that the
lower court was required to prove mother's unfitness in parental termination
proceedings by "clear and convincing" evidence); see also In re Selathia
Nicole F., 1997 WL 668365, at *1 (1st Dep't Oct. 28, 1997) (noting that a
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Inadequate counsel may present another barrier. Even in
criminal cases, the Supreme Court and Congress have "refus[ed]
to impose performance standards," erecting "herculean obstacles

to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."a5 Generally, the
parent claiming inadequacy must prove that the attorney's
incompetence denied the parent a fair trial, or that the attorney's
action was more than a harmless error.6
Even where the appointment of counsel is mandated, there
may be nonexistent or limited provisions for paying those lawyers
who represent indigent clients. State courts have held that
payment of appointed counsel need not be guaranteed or required
for due process." Lack of remuneration may limit the number of
attorneys willing to accept parental rights case, or their
enthusiasm for those cases they do undertake.
Finally, in some states, the right to counsel originates only

with procedures to terminate parental rights, even though
dependency proceedings may set the stage for terminating
parental rights.'

In addition, the right to counsel may differ

finding of permanent neglect was supported by "clear and convincing"
evidence in parental rights' termination proceedings).
' Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHm. L. REv. 494, 518 (1986). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984).
8
1 THOMAS JACOBS, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN CHILDREN
AND THE LAW: RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS, 74-75 (1995); In re Geist, 796 P.2d
1193, 1204 (Or. 1990); In re Brodbeck, 647 N.E.2d 240, 246 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994). Even in states which provide for a right to counsel, courts may invoke
Lassiter's denial of a right to counsel as justification for upholding a lower
court termination when remanding for rehearing does not seem appropriate.
ee State in ex rel. Driscoll, 410 So.2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
1 New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. D.C., 571 A.2d 1295
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Courts have also held that statutorily defined fee
schedules for attorneys do not deprive attorneys of time or property and cannot
be overridden by the presiding judge, since taking such cases is voluntary. See
Human Resources Dep't v. Paulson, 622 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
Cases accepted by lawyers in order to maintain positive relationships with the
presiding judge may stretch the definition of voluntary.
88 In re Guardianship of A.P., 644 So.2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
In re W.B., 213 IUl. App. 3d. 274, 571 N.E. 2d 1120 (1991). See also Judith
Wolff & William Grimm, Representing Parents in Termination of Parental
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depending upon whether parental rights are threatened by a state
or a private party, such as a step-parent. Statutes and/or case
law, in some states, prohibit the appointment of counsel for
indigent parents when a private party initiates action to terminate
parental rights.89 In other states, the courts have indicated that
the protection of the parent-child relationship requires providing
counsel for indigent parents, regardless of whether a private party
or the state has initiated proceedings to terminate parental
rights. 9°
The termination of parental rights makes parents "legal
nonentities,"

1

regardless

of who

initiates the

termination

proceedings. "The right to conceive and raise one's own children
is essential and fundamental," requiring special substantive and
procedural protection. 9

WHOSE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
SHOULD PREVAIL?
The importance of parents' rights varies according to state
statutes. The legally inexperienced parent may not understand
the ramifications of these differences.
Under the English
common law doctrine of parens patriae, "children were

considered to be the chattels owned by their parents, who had the
right to do more or less what they wanted to do with them. " 9'
Rights Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 849, 850 (1989); Smith, supra
note 15, at 1147.

In most states, counsel is only appointed for litigation between the state
and an indigent parent. In re Curtis S., 25 Cal. App.687, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
739, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Rosewell v. Hanrahan, 523 N.E.2d 10, 12 (I11.
Ct. App. 1988); Baird v. Harris, 778 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
9' In re Guardianship of Daley, 123 Misc.2d 139, 473 N.Y.S. 2d 114
(Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1984).
89

91

MARY ANN MASON,

FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S

RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 155 (1994).

1 John E. Theuman, Annotation, Constitutional Principles Applicable to
Award or Modification of Custody of Child -- Supreme Court Cases, 80 L.
Ed.2d 886, 888 (1986) (citing AM. JUR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw §568).
93 Kramer, supra note 24, at 3.
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The courts were reluctant to interfere in private family matters.'
As the concept of parens patriae declined, the states became
increasingly paternalistic, assuming the responsibility to protect
those who could not protect themselves. 95 Termination statutes
"protected, weighed, and balanced" four interests: the concern of
parents and children in perpetuating the family relationship; the
interest of the parent in the integrity of the family unit; the
interest of the child in a stable, caring environment; and the
state's interest in protecting the child.9s These statutes are often
"strictly construed in favor of the parent and the preservation of
the parent-child relationship. "9 "The state's first obligation is to
help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite
it if the child has already left home." 98 Statutes frequently
require proof that a family reunion is unlikely,9 and state courts
often insist upon an evaluation of all possible alternatives before
terminating parental rights.' °
Whose interests should prevail when the child can receive
"better treatment elsewhere?"'O While the state has a compelling
interest in preventing harm, does the state have the same interest
in ensuring that the child gets the "best" treatment possible? Can
the state determine what the "best" is?"~ These queries reflect
' See generally Becky Klemt, Comment, Family Law - Wyoming's New
Termination of Parental Rights Statute, 17 LAND & WATER L. REv. 621
(1982).
' Kramer, supra note 24, at 4.
6 Id. at 4-5.
' Jacobs, supra note 86, at 1.
98 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1995).
99 ALA. CODE § 12-15-65 (1995). This statute states in pertinent part:
If the court enters an order removing a child from his or her home
or continuing a child in a placement outside of his or her home
pursuant to this title, the order shall contain as specific findings, if
warranted by the evidence... [t]hat reasonable efforts have been
made or will be made to reunite the child and his or her family have
failed.
Id.
"oIn re Brand, 479 So.2d 66, 68 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).
101Note, supra note 58, at 472.
101Id.
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the conflict between the competing doctrines of "parents' rights"
and "the best interests of the child."' 0 3
Although the state codes recognize the importance of
meeting the needs of children, statutes also acknowledge the
fundamental right of a parent to raise their own children.
Interpreting such legislation can be difficult." ° The Alaska
Supreme Court held that while the best interests of the child were
relevant, the state must show parental conduct "sufficient to

justify termination."105

Similarly, Colorado statutes and courts

indicate that while the best interests of the child are paramount,
termination is a drastic remedy, impinging upon a parent's
fundamental liberty interests.'O° In contrast, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court justified the preponderance of evidence standard,
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Santosky,1°7 by
suggesting that while a higher standard might cut the risk of error
in curtailing parental rights, the higher standard could leave a
child in a dangerous home situation."'0

See generally Beth Frances Murphy, Comment, Termination of
ParentalRights, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 431 (1986).
'04
See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-2 (West 1992). The Illinois
103

Juvenile Court Act of 1987, for example, reflects this conflict. The legislature
indicated that preserving and strengthening family ties is a major goal of the

act, while indicating that "[tihe parents' rights to the custody of their child
shall not prevail when the court determines that it is contrary to the best
interests of the child." Id. at 405/ 1-2 (3) (c).
'0' Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).
106 COL. REv. STAT. ANN. §19-1-102 (West 1995). The text of the statute
states in pertinent part:
The general assembly declares that the purpose of this title are: (a)
to secure for each child ... such care and guidance, preferably in
his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of
society . . .(c) To remove a child from the custody of his parents
only when his welfare and safety or the protection of the public
would otherwise be endangered ....
Id. See also In re J.B., 702 P.2d 753, 755 (Col. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing
judgment terminating parent's right's
when mother had no opportunity to
argue, through counsel, the continued need for out of home placement).
107 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982).
108 State v. White, 460 A.2d 1017, 1025 (Me. 1983).
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If the parental rights doctrine predominates, the state must
prove the unfitness of the parents at the required level of proof
before intervening.' °9 Unless there is evidence to the contrary,
the assumption is that children should be with their biological
In the "best interests" approach, the state or a
parents. 1
prospective parent may not have to prove parental unfitness,"'
since this standard focuses on the psychological, physical, and
Some statutes clearly focus
emotional needs of the child." 2

on the rights of parents, maintaining that financial limitations
should not jeopardize the parental status."' The courts have held

that parental rights cannot be terminated because an opposing
party can provide a more comfortable or affluent environment., 4
Generally, "a parent's right to custody of a biological

child will not be disturbed in favor of a non-parent unless the
Sidney L. Moiler, Family Law-Termination of Parental Rights:
1o
Establishing Standardsfor the Wyoming Law, 16 LAND & WATER REV. 295,
300 (1981). "A biological parent is entitled to custody of the child unless he is
affirmatively shown to be unfit. Id.
"I Michael B. Thompson, Child-Custody Disputes Between Parents and
Non-Parents: A Plea for the Abrogation of the Parental-RightDoctrine in
South Dakota, 34 S.D. L. REV. 534, 539 (1989) (stating that the South
Dakota courts have fashioned a presumption that unless the parent is unfit, the
best interests of the child will be enhanced by recognizing and maintaining the
parent's right to custody).
II Statkus, supra note 109, at 300.
112

Thompson, supra note 110, at 537.

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511 (b) (West 1995). This statute
provides that "[t]he rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent." Id.
14 When determining 'best interests" of the child, the foster parent and
biological parent should not be compared. The primary consideration should
be fitness of the parent. See, e.g., In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 308, 604
N.E.2d 122, 127, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 65 (1992); In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d
1 (Conn. 1992) (granting a natural mother's motion to open a judgment where
the lower court terminated her rights because the pre-adoptive parents
appeared to be more suitable than the natural mother); In re Juvenile Appeal,
420 A.2d 875, 882 (Conn. 1979) (stating that a child should be placed only
when the needs of the child plainly demonstrate necessity; financial resources
are not an overriding factor).
11
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parent is first proved to be unfit or to have forfeited the right to
custody." 5 Grounds upon which unfitness can be proven vary
from state to state, but codes generally list such grounds as
neglect, abandonment, physical and sexual abuse, harm, no
foreseeable ability to become a capable parent, incarceration for
the period when child needs parenting, and inability "to discharge
responsibilities to child."

16

The parents' right to raise their own

children is not absolute when the best interests of the child
require state intervention due to "misconduct, neglect,
immorality, abandonment, or dereliction of duty of such
proportions that termination is in the child's best interests.""'
Although the state must prove that there are grounds for declaring
that a parent is unfit, the presence of such grounds does not
mandate termination of parental rights." 8
"I Thompson, supra note 110, at 536. See also In re Guardianship of
J.E.D., 524 A.2d 1255, 1261-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
116 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 170-C:5 (1994). The text of this statute states
in pertinent part:
Grounds for termination of parental rights may be granted when one
or more of the following conditions exist: The parent has
abandoned the child.... they have substantially and continuously
neglected to provide the child with necessary subsistence, education
or other care necessary for his mental, emotional , or physical
health or have substantially and continuously neglected to pay for
such subsistence, education or other care .... [t]he parent
knowingly or willfully caused severe sexual, physical, emotional, or
mental abuse of the child.
Id.
1I1 Kramer, supra note 24, at 7. See In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d 365,
381-84 (W. Va. 1991). In Carlita B., the court affirmed termination of
parental rights, noting that despite efforts to help the mother deal with her own
erratic outbursts and despite several improvement plans, the mother did not
appear capable of taking adequate care of Carlita. Id. at 384.
"8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31(b) (1995). This statute states in
pertinent part:
Should the court conclude that irrespective of the existence of one or
more circumstances authorizing termination of parental rights, the
best interests of the child require that such rights should not be
terminated, the court shall dismiss the petition, but only after setting
forth the facts and conclusions upon which such dismissal is based.
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Most state codes suggest that the state has a responsibility
to demonstrate that an effort has been made to help parents

improve their parenting, although the Maryland legislature has
directed that the court cannot take into consideration the
probability that the parent-child relationship would improve the

prognosis for rehabilitation of the parent1

9

Improvement in

parenting must be effected "within a reasonable period of time"
in order to release children who would otherwise languish in
temporary homes beyond the age when they might be expected to
find permanent families 2° As Justice Stewart recognized in
Lassiter, termination and custody proceedings must be completed
as quickly as possible in order to promote the availability for
adoption and permanency.'
The termination statute ostensibly
furthers the state's policy of providing abused and neglected
children with a "permanent plan of care at the earliest possible

age,"'2 so that the child may obtain "custody, care, and
See also In re Tyson, 333 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. Ct. App. 1985).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313(c)(5)(iv) (1995). This statute
states in pertinent part:
In determining whether it is in the best interest of the child to
terminate a natural parent's rights. . . the court shall
consider... the effort the natural parent has made to adjust the
natural parent's circumstances, conduct... to make it in the best
interest of the child to be returned to the natural parent's
home.., but, the court may not consider whether the maintenance
of the parent-child relationship may serve as an inducement for the
natural parent's rehabilitation.
Id.
120 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5526 (1995); W.V. CODE § 49-6-2b (1995).
In addition, since October 31, 1983, the federal government has required that
states make a reasonable effort to avoid placement or reunite families as a
condition for providing funding for foster care. 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15)
(1994).
19

121

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.22(2) (1995). This statute states in
pertinent part:
It is the further purpose of this Article to recognize the necessity for
any child to have a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible
age, while at the same time recognizing the need to protect all
122
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discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
have been given by his or her parents."'
Despite these noble
goals, there is a recognition that termination of parental rights
may not lead to a permanent family and the stability idealized in
the literature and statutes. 24 For the child who never secures an
enduring relationship with adoptive parents, in particular, the
termination of parental rights and the loss of even minimal
contact with birth parents can be harmful. "5
A comprehension of the state statutes determining parental
rights requires an understanding of the law not generally available
to parents without a legal education. Further, counsel may be
necessary to integrate these statutes and the local processes for
implementing them.

STATE RESPONSE TO LASSITER
During the middle of the twentieth century, the United
States Supreme Court adopted a more activist, rights-based
philosophy, pressing reluctant states to join their peers in
promoting higher standards of due process and equal rights
protection.126 In Lassiter, the Supreme Court declined to require
children from the unnecessary severance of a relationship with
biological or legal parents.
Id.

"2 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2(3) (1994). This statute states in pertinent
part: "When a child is removed from his or her own family, to secure for him
or her custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which should have been given by his or her parents." Id.
124 Gary R. Govert, Termination of Parental Rights: Putting Love in Its
Place, 63 N.C. L. REv. 1177, 1182 (1985).
25

Marsha Garrison, Wiy Terminate ParentalRights?, 35 STAN. L. REV.

423, 425, 453 (1983).
126

LAWRENCE BAUM,
THE SUPREME COURT 195-98 (4th ed. 1992).
Throughout this period, the Court induced the states to expand rights,
mandating integrated schools, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and broadening the use of the exclusionary rule, see Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, the Court held that any evidence improperly
obtained may not be presented in the courtroom. Id. at 657-58.
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the expansion of the right to counsel, despite diverging state and
lower court decisions.127
The holding and dicta in Lassiter have been referred to in
a wide variety of situations, including cases which demonstrate

the importance of parenting,' the ambiguity and/or importance
of due process, 2' and the right to counsel only when loss of
liberty is threatened.' 3"

Although Lassiter has been cited to

support statutes or judicial decisions, more frequently the prestige
and authority of the Supreme Court and its opinions have been
utilized to justify existing state requirements and customs, even
when the issues themselves have little to do with the substantive
concerns in Lassiter.'3
Despite advocate fears, state legislatures and courts have
not followed the lead of the Supreme Court. State legislatures
have continued to expand the statutory right to counsel in
involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings. These
courts appear to recognize that as family situations have become
increasingly complex, the need for expert counsel has increased.
Adults, who could previously be ignored by the courts, have

Miller, supra note 16, at 185.
Care & Protection of Frank, 567 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Mass. 1991)
(stating that removal of children is a "substantial deprivation.").
29 In re A.S.A, 852 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1993).
13
Fitzpatrick v. Hoehn, 746 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App. 1988); State v.
Cook, 481 A. 2d 823 (N.H. 1984).
131
See, e.g., Anderson v. Jacobs, 428 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1981)
(concerning court payment of paternity test for an indigent defendant);
Archuleta v. Goldman, 761 P.2d 425 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Bexard Co.
Sheriff's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Davis, 802 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1990)
(concerning a prison inmate's suit claiming authorities' indifference to medical
needs); Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W. 2d 699 (Neb. 1983) (concerning
termination of pregnancy); Roanoke Chowan Regional Housing Auth. v.
Vaughan, 344 S.E.2d 578 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986). (concerning landlord-tenant
dispute). See also Sheedy v. Merrimack County Superior Court, 509 A.2d
144 (N.H. 1986). The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied the right to
counsel to a debtor in jeopardy of incarceration for contempt, suggesting that
the presumption in Lassiter that an indigent subject to incarceration was
entitled to counsel was dicta, rather than a holding. Id. at 148.
127
2
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become increasingly important to children.' 32 For many children,
step-parents, grand-parents, and foster parents have become the
psychological parents: the adults "who on a continuing day-to-day

bases,

through interaction,

companionship,

interplay,

and

mutuality" fulfill the child's physical and psychological needs.,33
Although the statutes reflect society's desire for perfect parents,13
laws and judges have been and will be forced to deal with an

increasing variety of family relationships.
As noted previously, in the seventeen states where there

was no statutory right to counsel prior to Lassiter, state codes
now indicate a variety of provisions for counsel for indigent
parents involved in involuntary termination of parental rights
proceedings. In most of these states, the rights of indigent
parents have been strengthened since 1981.13 In the thirty-three
states which had previously provided for parental right to
counsel, only one state currently utilizes the minimal case-by-case
36
criteria outlined in Lassiter.1

CONCLUSIONS
In court battles, "the rights of the child, the parents and
society stand to be abridged. Advocates for each set of rights
,32 Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premises of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 962 (1984). By 1984, over 40 states had created
statutory exceptions to the common law that had previously applied to the
relationships between children and their grandparents. Id. at 934.
,33 Thompson, supra note 110, at 562.
, Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumption of Justice: Law, Politics, and the
Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1201, 1203 (1990).
"' The North Carolina legislature enacted a statute providing for the
parental right to counsel in termination proceedings in 1981, the same year that
the Supreme Court denied the existence of a constitutional right to counsel in
Abby Lassiter's action against the North Carolina Department of Social
Services. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7A-289.23 (1995).
136 It is unclear whether the Mississippi code ever recognized a statutory
right to counsel for parents threatened with termination of parental rights. See
supra notes 79, 80.
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prevent this abridgement by presenting the strongest possible case
to the court." 3 7 Legal representation helps to equalize the battle
between indigent parents and the resources, expertise, and
experience of government agencies.
The true test of the right to counsel exists in the thousands
of trial courts across the United States. Counsel in termination of
parental rights proceedings may be offered in states where there
is no statutory guarantee.'
When there is no constitutional or
statutory right to counsel, however, the appointment of counsel is
a privilege that can be terminated when funds are limited or
priorities are altered, leaving parents who need counsel in a
precarious position.
Prior to Lassiter, state courts and legislatures expanded
the right to counsel in termination proceedings in anticipation of a
Supreme Court decision that would proclaim a constitutional right
to counsel. The Supreme Court's holding in Lassiter appeared to
jeopardize any expansion of the right to counsel in civil
proceedings and raised the fear that future cases would further
restrict rights.
In contrast, this study demonstrates that the state courts
and legislatures have become increasingly sensitive to the right to
counsel. State courts have refused to follow the Supreme Court
when the Court's holdings conflict with state interpretation of due
process standards or local concepts of fundamental fairness. The
response of the state courts to Lassiter suggests that these courts
can provide a receptive venue for rights conscious litigants.

" Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey, The Roles of Counsel for the
Parentin Child Dependency Proceedings, 22 GA. L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1988).
"' Telephone Interview with Debra Ratterman Baker, American Bar
Association Center on Children and the Law (January 30, 1996). According to
Ms. Baker's experience, indigent parents have been accorded counsel for
termination proceedings throughout the United States. Id. In some states,
however, indigent parents have had difficulty obtaining appointed
representation in earlier stages that may lead to termination. Id
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TABLE I:
THE CURRENT STATUS OF RIGHT TO
COUNSEL STATUTES FOR PARENTS
THREATENED WITH TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THE STATES THAT
OFFERED NO GUARANTEE OF COUNSEL
PRIOR TO LASSITER

CASE BY CASE DETERMINATION
Delaware

Hawaii
South Carolina
Tennessee
Wyoming

COUNSEL REQUIRED

Florida
North Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
COUNSEL REQUIRED
ONLY IF REQUESTED
Arkansas

Georgia
New Mexico

Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
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TABLE II:
THE CURRENT STATUS OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
STATUTES FOR PARENTS THREATENED WITH
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THE STATES
THAT OFFERED COUNSEL PRIOR TO LASSITER

CASE - BY - CASE
DETERMINATION

COUNSEL REQUIRED
ONLY IF REQUESTED

Mississippi

Alabama
Colorado
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
Utah

COUNSEL REOUIRED
Alaska
Arizona
California
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
New York
Washington
Wisconsin
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TABLE MII: STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
FOR PARENTAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
PROCEEDINGS
Alabama

ALA. CODE § 12-15-63 (1995).

Alaska

CINA Rule 12 (1995).

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-225 (1995).

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(f)(1)
(Michie 1995).

California

CAL.

WELF.

&

INST.

CODE

§ 336.26(f)(2)(West 1996). Failure of
parent to appear in response to notice of
hearing may relieve the court of the
responsibility to appoint counsel. In re
Angela R., 260 Cal. Rptr. 612, 212; Cal.
App. 3d 257 (1989).
Colorado

COLO. REV.
(West 1997).

STAT.

ANN.

§ 19-1-1012

Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-135
(West 1995).
Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1111 (1993).

Dist. of Col. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304 (1996).
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Florida

279

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.465 (1)(a)

(West 1996). See also FL. R. Juv. PROC.
§8.515.
Georgia

GA. CODEANN. § 15-11-85

(Harrison 1994).
Hawaii

HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-62 (1993).

Idaho

IDAHO CODE § 16-2009 (1995).

Illinois

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/1-5(1)

(West 1997).
Juv. CT. AcT of 1987, P.A. 85-601
(Smith-Hurd 1996).
Indiana

IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-3 (Michie 1996).

Iowa

IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.113 (West 1996).

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1533, 1582 (d)
(1995).
If a parent named in a termination petition
fails to appear in court, the court must
appoint counsel.

Kentucky

KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 625.080(3)
(Banks-Baldwin 1995). An indigent parent
has a right to counsel if counsel is
requested and if counsel appears to be
"reasonably necessary in the interests of
justice." Id.

Louisiana

LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. § 1016
(West 1995).
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Maine

ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005.2
(West 1995). While the statute appears to
require counsel if requested, the Maine
courts have generally held that counsel is
required unless intelligently waived.
See Danforth v. Dep't of Health &
Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 796 (Me. 1973).

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §5-323 (1995)

Mass.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29
(West 1996)
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has
held, based on Lassiter, that counsel is only
mandatory when the deprivation of counsel
results in "fundamental unfairness," even

when personal liberty is in jeopardy.
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 446 N.E.2d
383, 388 (Mass. 1983).
Michigan

MICH. CT. R. § 5.915(B)
(West 1996).

Minnesota

MINN. R. Juv. PROC.§ 40.01 (West 1996).

Mississippi

MISS.

CODE ANN.

§ 93-15-109 (1996).

Specific statute referring to the right to
counsel in termination of parental rights
proceedings was repealed in 1979. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 3-21-17 (1993).
Missouri

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.462
(West 1996).

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-401(12) (1995).

Nebraska

NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-279.01 (1993).
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Nevada

NEV.

REV.

STAT.

281
ANN.

§ 128.100(2)

(Michie 1993).

New Hamp. N.H. REv.
New Jersey

§ 170-C: 10 (1994).

STAT. ANN.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43 (West 1996).

Indigent parent threatened with loss of
parental rights has a right to counsel and
may apply to the public defender's office
for such assistance. Id.

New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(F) (Michie
1995).

New York

N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §262 (McKinney
1996).

N. Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7A-289.23 (1996).
N. Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-45 (1995).

Ohio

OHIo REV. CODE
(Anderson 1996).

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
(West 1996).

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.518 (1995)

Penn.

23 PA. CONS. STAT.
(West 1996).

Rh. Island

R.I. GEN. LAvS § 4-1-31 (1994).

S. Carolina

S.C. CODE ANN. §20-7-1570
(Law. Co-op. 1995).
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S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-7A-30,
31 (Michie 1992).

Tennessee

TENN. R. Juv. PRoc. §39-(f)(2) (1995).

Texas

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013

(West 1996).
Utah

UTAH CODE. ANN. § 78-3a-35(2a) (1995).

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5519(c) (1995).

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266
(Michie 1995).

Wash.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.090(c)
(West 1996).

W. Virginia W.VA. CODE § 49-6-2 (1995).
Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.23(2)
(West 1995).

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-318
(Michie 1994).
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